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
**The CINC and the Citizen-Soldier: Meeting Tomorrow's Challenge (U)**

by

Markus Pfahler  
Major, USMC

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



Signature: Markus Pfahler

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## **Abstract**

In today's world the geographic and functional CINC's cannot succeed without the active and effective support of the Reserve Components (RC). America's National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement, military downsizing, and the Department of Defense's 1995 directive mandating the increased use of the RC to relieve AC OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO has resulted in the increased utilization of Reservists.

With this shift in emphasis comes increased concerns about accessibility. Operation Desert Shield/Storm and other more recent operations identified problems with RC accessibility. Many argue that initiatives put in place to correct those deficiencies have led to a fully accessible RC. A more guarded opinion is in order. With the CINC's becoming increasingly engaged in peacetime operations and fewer Reservists available to assist, the Reservists that remain are seeing increased employment. This situation could lead to accessibility problems in the future.

This paper examines the issues surrounding accessibility and suggests steps the CINC's and the Services can take to improve not only accessibility, but also effective integration of Reservists into the CINC's operations.

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## Chapter One

### Introduction

*The Reservist is twice the citizen*

Winston Churchill

As the next century approaches, the contribution of the citizen-soldier will be more integral to the nation's defense than at any time since the Revolutionary War. The National Security Strategy, military downsizing and restructuring, and instability in the post-Cold War have led to increased reliance upon the Reserve Components (RC)[1]. Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS/S) saw the first ever use of Presidential Selective Recall (PSRC) authority to involuntarily call-up Reserves from all the Services. Problems accessing Reservists during ODS/S and other more recent operations led to broad policy and process reforms aimed at increasing RC accessibility.[2]

These changes have aided the Commander-In-Chief's (CINC) ability to plan, access, and employ RC forces. However, with the CINCs becoming increasingly engaged in military operations other than war (MOOTW), a RC smaller today than yesterday, and Reservists asked to play an ever increasing role, planners will experience increasing problems with RC accessibility. This paper examines the implications of increased RC utilization by the CINCs, and suggests changes to current policies and processes.

The paper begins with a presentation of background information, briefly outlining the evolution of the Total Force, and describes why citizen-soldiers are vital to the CINC's future success. Chapter three examines issues associated with voluntary and involuntary call-up and the potential for accessibility problems in the future. Chapter four looks towards the future, defines the challenge, describes recent initiatives that promote increased accessibility, and presents

proposals aimed at improving the CINC's ability to access the RC. And finally, chapter five summarizes the paper's findings.

The CINC's ability to access needed RC capabilities is influenced by two significant areas that are beyond the scope of this paper: Force structure and mobilization readiness. While their examination is, unfortunately, not possible, a few points bear mention nonetheless. Force structure, which involves the distribution of forces and capabilities among the Active Component (AC) and RC, impacts the method used to access the RC.[3] Mobilization readiness is a function of numerous elements (e.g. leadership, funding, training, equipment, manning, etc.). It impacts planners when capabilities resident in the RC are not available for immediate deployment and employment due to unacceptable readiness levels.

## Chapter Two

### The New World Order

*We want them to receive the most realistic training possible, play a larger role in a range of non-combat missions, and become better integrated with Active forces for combat operations. In doing so, the Reserve Components will become more mission-ready for the security challenges of the post-Cold War era, while at the same time helping to ease the operating tempo of the Active forces.*

William J. Perry,  
Secretary of Defense

#### *A Historical Perspective*

The concept of employing citizen-soldiers to defend the nation goes back to the republic's infancy. Our founding fathers, by way of the U.S. Constitution, authorized not only a standing federal army, but a state militia. Congress provided for calling forth the Militia "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." [4] While citizen-soldiers have fought alongside their active counterparts throughout the nation's brief 220 year history, it was not until the Vietnam era that an integrated approach to the active and reserve relationship began to evolve.

In August of 1970, responding to the requirements of the national security strategy and the reality of decreasing defense budgets, then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird directed the Services to apply a total force concept to all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing National Guard and Reserve forces. In 1973 the Department adopted the concept as the *Total Force Policy*. Progression forward has not been without difficulty. Many RC units in the intervening years were not mobilization and combat ready; lacking trained personnel and modern equipment. Today, 25 years later, however, this concept has proven largely successful.




## *A New Paradigm*

The CINCs growing reliance upon the RC is a trend that will continue into the future. From FY85 through FY92 the RC increased steadily from 33.6 percent of DOD's force structure, to 38.1 percent.[5] By FY99 the RC is slated to make up nearly 49 percent of the Total Force. Why is this?

Reassessment of national priorities and security strategy following the collapse of the Soviet empire led to a reordering of federal spending. With no major peer competitor on the horizon spending priorities shifted towards domestic programs and deficit reduction. Defense spending as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) has decreased 40 percent since 1986.[6] The future for defense spending is not bright. As Table 1 shows, growth in entitlement programs, particularly Medicare and Medicaid, has been increasing steadily. By 2010 it is expected to balloon as baby boomers begin to retire. [7]

Table 1



Reassessment of national security concerns and the need to downsize the military led to initiatives such as the 1989-1992 Base Force Plan, the 1993 Bottom Up Review, and the 1994 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM). Their recommendations led to a significant reshaping of America's military. By FY97 the AC will have been reduced 33 percent from FY87 levels while the RC will have been reduced 23 percent from its highest level in FY89.[8] Cost-efficiencies were driving factors in shifting force structure from the AC to the RC. Today the RC provides approximately 38 percent of the armed forces end strength while costing only eight percent of the Department of Defense's (DOD) budget.[9] Appendix A depicts current AC/RC force structure within DOD and among the Services. Appendices B through E provide Service specific listing depicting the percentage of force structure resident in the RC for selected capabilities.

While the National Military Strategy calls for U.S. forces to possess the capability to respond to two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs), the new National Security Strategy's call for "engagement and enlargement" has led to increasing involvement in crisis response and MOOTW.[10] The post-Cold War world is one of regional instabilities, caused in part by the breakup of the Soviet empire, renewal of ethnic hatreds, famine, and natural disasters. When one considers only 13 UN peacekeeping operations were approved during the 42 years from 1945 through 1987, while 13 new ones were approved in the five years between 1987 and 1992, a reasonable assumption can be made that the CINCs will be heavily involved in MOOTW in the near future.[11]

In FY96 the Secretary of Defense set up a pilot program to increase the peacetime operational use of the RC to relieve AC operational and personnel tempo. This support, coined "Compensating Leverage" by Deborah Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,

looks for smart mission-effective ways to leverage the Guard and Reserves to help compensate for the smaller active forces and to help control peacetime costs. [12]

The evidence presented suggests that as long as budgets remain tight and operational tempo remains high, the RCs will be key players in the CINCs gameplans; and, therefore, CINC and Joint Task Force (JTF) planners must be able to access needed RC capabilities. But will they be able to?

## Chapter Three

### Accessing the Reserve Components

*We can no longer afford the skepticism that has marked AC and RC relations in the past. The time for debate is over.*

General John J. Sheehan, USMC  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

Planners for the CINC and the JTF commander have two basic options for accessing reservists: voluntary call-up, and involuntary call-up. (See Appendix F for a description of call-up authorities.) Each method has unique considerations which influence accessibility, and which planners must take into consideration.

#### *Voluntary Verses Involuntary Call-Up*

CINC and JTF planners must consider Service positions towards voluntary and involuntary call-up authority. Service stances are a function of core competencies, different AC/RC structure mix, and philosophical differences concerning mobilization and employment of reservists. During the Gulf War, for example, the Air Force and Marine Corps initially opposed a call-up. The Air Force was adamant that it could do the job with Reserve volunteers, while the Marine Corps advertised it did not require RC augmentation for the first 60 days. The Navy favored only a limited call-up of medical personnel to back-fill stateside hospitals. Only the Army and the Coast Guard supported the involuntary call-up. However, as the scope of the operation became known, all the Services used PSRC authority and partial mobilization.

#### *Voluntary Call-Up*

With the CINCs increasingly conducting MOOTW, the requirement for volunteers is also rising, particularly when PSRC authority is not sought by the CINC or, if requested, rejected by the NCA. In considering the use of volunteers, CINC, JTF and Service planners must take into

consideration a number of factors: the Reservist's period of availability; the amount of prior notification required; qualifications for the assignment; availability of active duty funds; and statutory restrictions on the number of active duty days that can be served per fiscal year. Working through these considerations is time consuming, difficult, and often frustrating for planners.

Volunteerism does have its drawbacks. One is that volunteers can *un-volunteer* themselves-- usually at the last hour. Army National Guard officials had to find replacement volunteers for a number of soldiers who dropped out just prior to a six month unit deployment to the Sinai.[13] *Coerced volunteerism* is another issue planners must consider, particularly when PSRC authority is not used and the requirement for volunteers involves groups vice individuals. The experience of Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment in "volunteering" for service at Guantanamo, Cuba illustrates this problem.[14] A final drawback is the potential for Reservists to abuse their civilian employer-employee relationship. If Reservists are perceived by their employer to be volunteering excessively, the employer may reduce or withdraw his support. While these last two drawbacks are probably transparent to CINC and JTF planners they are, nonetheless, important. Both lead to retention problems which could possibly result in shortages in certain skill areas that planner may need to access at some later date. This is one reason many favor the involuntary call-up of Reservists.

### ***Involuntary Call-Up Authority***

Of the three methods of involuntary accession, PSRC has caused operational planners the most difficulty in recent years. Planners must understand procedures for processing requests for PSRC authority, associated legal limitations, and political factors. The experiences of the past decade (1983-1994) reveals several procedural problems in obtaining early authority to call up RC units

and individuals involuntarily. One of the main problems to rapid and effective accession of the RCs has been general ignorance of the authorities and procedures for involuntary call-up. ODS/S marked the first time PSRC authority was requested since its enactment in 1976. Because existing plans and procedures were still geared towards the Soviet threat (and based on a full and fast mobilization of the RC), defense leaders had not envisioned the use of PSRC authority or partial or full mobilization to order RC personnel to active duty involuntarily for lesser wars. With little thought previously given to how to implement these authorities for a lesser war scenario, the request for PSRC authority took 17 days before being approved.[15]

In Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) planners did not understand that they had to request PSRC. Fortunately, rapid action by the Pentagon saved the day. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) planners involved with Vigilant Warrior in 1994 also lacked familiarity and had to be assisted by the Joint Staff. In the words of one mobilization planner, "AC officers don't know how to do mobilization." This domain is frequently left to RC officers on full-time active duty or IMAs. In the Army, AC war planners are set quite apart from RC mobilization and support. In so doing, the RC is not integrated into the thinking, planning, and execution process.[16]

Legal restrictions attached to PSRC authority caused significant problems for CENTCOM and Service planners during ODS/S. PSRC authority at the time only authorized 90 days of involuntary active duty with a 90 day extension available from the President. This made force planning difficult, particularly for the Army. Because PSRC authority did not extend to members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), they were not accessible.

Planners have often been frustrated because the status on a previously submitted request for PSRC authority hangs in limbo because of political considerations. Part of the 17 day delay in

receiving PSRC authority during ODS/S was because the President felt the call-up was too large from a political standpoint.[17] Operation Restore Hope, discussed above, also demonstrates the politics associated with involuntary call-up. As that operation dragged on, the need for PSRC increased, yet the political will to invoke it decreased as a result of the operation's growing unpopularity.

### ***Is Accessibility Still an Issue***

Many now make the argument that RC accessibility is no longer a significant problem. Even the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs appears to agree, having recently stated, "... I believe that the Reserves are fully accessible." [18] An increasing willingness to invoke involuntary call-up authority, extensive volunteerism, and recent initiatives have facilitated accessibility. However, accessibility is composed of many dynamic and interrelated parts. Problems in any single area may lead to a rise in accessibility problems.

It is generally acknowledged that RC OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO has increased in the past few years. With many of the CINCs increasingly engaged in peacetime assistance operations reliance on the RC will increase. A question being asked but difficult to quantify is: how much more responsibility can be placed on the RCs before retention and other problems begin to emerge? Terrence M. O'Connell, Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, recently voiced words of caution when he stated "We also cannot ignore the OPTEMP of the members of the RC... It is essential, for the good of the Total Force, to maintain a proper balance among our RC's commitments to military service, civilian employment and family." [19]

Accessibility will increasingly become an issue--unless current processes and policies are improved.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Supporting the CINC In The New Millennium**

*My plan for using Reserve component forces  
in the AOR is based on One Team-One Mission!*

General George A. Joulwan, USA  
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command

#### ***The Challenge***

Today's challenge is to ensure the CINCs have accessibility to the RCs to meet tomorrow's operational and security requirements. It is simply a case of ensuring supply meets demand. And demand for RC support will increase in the future for the reasons previously cited in chapter two. While recent initiatives have improved RC accessibility, additional change and innovation are necessary to meet this growing demand.

#### ***Recent Initiatives***

RC accessibility problems during ODS/S and other more recent operations have led to numerous initiatives by the DOD. Completed initiatives include: extension of the active duty call-up period under PSRC authority (from 180) to 270 days, authorized by passage of the 1995 Defense Authorization Act (DAA); implementation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act (USERRA) in 1995; and mobilization insurance for Reservists, authorized by passage of the 1996 DAA.[20]

Other initiatives presently in various stages of completion include: a legislative effort to provide tax credits to employers of Reservists who are ordered to active duty; a pilot program to provide families of mobilized Reservists with affordable health care options; and a task force to study recruiting and retention.[21] While many of these initiatives are directed at recruiting and



retention of Reservists and maintaining the support of employers, they do contribute directly to accessibility.

The CINCs too have worked to improve accessibility. CINC, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) adopted a comprehensive approach to RC integration into operations within its Area of Responsibility (AOR) by developing a Reserve Component Campaign Plan. It provides the CINC's direction and guidance for the use of RC forces in the AOR. The plan is an integral part of the Theater Security Planning System and, thus, supports USEUCOM's Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness. USEUCOM established a Directorate for Mobilization and Reserve Component Affairs to assist with the full integration of the RC into USEUCOM's mission, to participate in long-range planning and strategy development, and to provide liaison with National Guard and Reserve senior leadership.

USEUCOM also established a Joint Reserve Component Council (JRCC) to maintain liaison with its component commands and RC commanders, identify RC resources, and recommend reserve forces for particular activities. To provide adequate lead-time to the RCs, opportunities for RC support are identified in the deliberate planning process 18-24 months out and validated at annual conferences.[22] In similar fashion, USCENTCOM recently established a Reserve Forces Readiness Division to act as the focal point for coordinating Reserve budgeting, policies, programming, recruiting, training, and quality of life.

### ***Meeting the Challenge***

*New processes and lines of communication must be forged and refined; old, comfortable ways of thinking and acting discarded; innovation and flexibility are the order of the day.*

General George A. Joulwan, USA  
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command

As the relationship between the CINCs and the RCs continues to mature, so to must the processes and policies which support and facilitate accessibility. The following recommendations work towards this end:

- The geographic and functional CINCs, in concert with subordinate commands and RC leadership at each of the Services, should develop processes which lead to the formal planning, programming and budgeting of the CINC's annual RC requirements by the Services. The key to leveraging RC participation is for the Services to plan RC participation 18-24 months in advance and budget sufficient funds to support them.[23]
- Streamline procedures for requesting PSRC. [24]
- DOD must put in place a reliable (quantitative vice subjective) warning and indication system to flag potential problems with over-reliance on volunteers and excessive use of PSRC authority.
- Streamline existing regulations and processes governing Reserve drill and pay with a goal of flexibility in drill attendance and simplicity in pay administration.
- Establish a Reserve Affairs Directorate at each CINC, similar in mission to USEUCOM's.
- Place a minimum of one qualified, full-time RC officer in each of the directorates (e.g., J1, J2, etc.) at CINC and JTF headquarters.
- The CINCs should allow RC unit commanders more latitude in determining how to apply his resources to accomplish the mission assigned (e.g. variable tour lengths, rotate individual members of a unit vice the unit).
- The CINCs, through their Reserve Affairs Directorate, should coordinate with the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) to conduct outreach programs designed to inform selected state officials and key business

leaders (e.g., governors, adjutant generals) about Reserve contributions to the CINC's mission. These programs should include such things as official visits to the CINC's AOR, and annual reports describing RC participation.

- DOD and the Services must continue to create incentives for RC recruitment, retention and participation - not penalties.

## Chapter Five

### Conclusions

*We can no longer afford the skepticism that has marked AC and RC relations in the past. The time for debate is over.*

General John J. Sheehan, USMC  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command

In today's world the geographic and functional CINCs cannot succeed without active and effective RC support. America's strategy of engagement and enlargement, the DOD's 1995 initiative to use the RCs for AC OPSTEMPO/PERSTEMPO relief, and force restructuring driven by a need for cost efficiency, has placed more of the military's combat, combat support and combat service support in the RC. Traditional roles for Reservists have changed. Once relegated to an augmentation and reinforcement role in Europe, Reservists today are actively engaged in support of the regional CINCs peacetime operations.

With this shift in emphasis towards the RC come concerns about accessibility. Accessibility is a function of many factors, some having a direct and overt impact, and others a more indirect and more subtle effect. Some of these factors led themselves to easier analysis, such as the impact of decreased funding upon readiness, while other factors, such as the impact of retention on accessibility is more difficult to quantify. This makes predictions concerning accessibility more of an art than a science, with short term patterns difficult to discern.

ODS/S and other more recent operations identified problems with accessibility. Many argue today that initiatives put in place to correct those deficiencies have led to a fully accessible RC. A more guarded opinion is in order. The CINCs level of involvement in peacetime operations will continue, if not increase in the coming years. Force structure reductions have led to a smaller RC.


With increasing operational requirements to fill and less Reservists available to fill them, those that remain will experience an increasing level of involvement. [25]

Staff planners rely heavily on volunteerism, and more recently PSRC authority to fill operational and support needs. Policy makers, military leaders and operational planners must ensure a balance is maintained between military duty, families and employers. Monitoring trends in accessibility, and identifying undesirable trends early requires improved processes. The CINCs and the Services still have much to do to improve RC integration and accessibility. The proposals suggested in the previous chapter should facilitate efforts in this direction.


## Appendix A

### AC/RC Force Structure (Based on projected FY97 data)


#### DOD




#### Active Component



#### Reserve Component




#### ARMY




#### NAVY



#### AIR FORCE



#### MARINE CORPS



Source: Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress, March 1996

## Appendix B

### Army National Guard and Army Reserve Contributions to the Total Army

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>Army National Guard</u>	<u>Army Reserve</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Army</u>
Training Divisions	0	9	100%
Chemical Brigades	1	3	100%
Water Supply Battalions	3	1	100%
Enemy Prisoner of War Brigades	0	1	100%
Judge Advocate General Units	0	17	100%
Roundout/Roundout Brigades	7	0	100%
Separate Brigades	9	0	100%
Exercise Divisions	0	5	100%
Civil Affairs Units	0	35	97%
Petroleum Support Battalions	6	6	92%
Public Affairs Units	47	45	85%
Medical Brigades	2	9	85%
Psychological Operations Units	0	30	81%
Transportation Composite Groups	0	4	80%
Motor Battalions	6	12	78%
Hospitals	17	43	77%
Chemical Battalions	1	8	75%
Corps Support Groups	20	10	75%
Medical Groups	1	7	73%
Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)	14	15	73%
Maintenance Battalions	10	5	71%
Engineer Battalions (Combat)	39	25	70%
Military Police Battalions	11	13	66%
Medium Helicopter Battalions	3	1	66%
Field Artillery Battalions	88	5	58%
Training Brigades	0	2	55%
Petroleum Groups	0	1	50%
Terminal Battalions	0	3	50%
Infantry Divisions	2	0	50%
Aviation Brigades	9	5	50%
Armor Divisions	1	0	50%
Corps Support Commands	1	2	50%
Air Defense Battalions	22	0	48%
Infantry Divisions	4	0	44%
Area Support Groups	9	3	44%
Military Police Brigades	2	1	43%
Theater Army Area Commands	0	2	40%
Military Intelligence Battalions	7	12	39%
Attack Helicopter Battalions	13	3	38%
Signal Battalions	29	5	36%
Armored Cavalry Regiments	1	0	33%
Light Infantry Divisions	1	0	33%
Air Assault Battalions	2	3	31%
Special Forces Groups	2	0	29%

## Appendix B

### Army National Guard and Army Reserve Contributions to the Total Army

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>Army National Guard</u>	<u>Army Reserve</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Army</u>
Ordnance Battalions	0	2	29%
Air Defense Brigades	2	0	25%
Engineer Battalions (Topographical)	1	0	25%

Sources: The Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Army (DAMO-FDF).  
Data as of 30 Sep 1995.



## Appendix C

### Naval Reserve Contributions to the Total Navy

<u>Unit Type</u>	<u>Number of Units</u>	<u>Percent of Total Navy</u>
Fighter Composite Squadrons (U.S. based)	2	100%
Heavy Logistics Support (C-130)	4	100%
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	28	100%
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Groups	2	100%
Logistics Support Squadrons	10	100%
Naval Embarked Advisory Teams (NEAT)	7	100%
Naval Control of Shipping (Military Personnel)	18	99%
Cargo Handling Battalions	13	93%
Military Sealift Command (Personnel)	38	85%
Warfare Support Helicopter Squadrons	2	80%
Mobile Constructions Battalions	12	60%
Mobile Diving and Salvage Units (Personnel)	14	60%
Special Boat Units	2	50%
Helicopter Combat Support (H-3)	1	50%
Intelligence Program	103	48%
Fleet Hospitals	4	40%
Maritime Patrol Squadrons	9	40%
Naval Special Warfare Units	16	38%
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units	4	33%
Fast Frigates (FFG-7s)	14	29%
Mobile Mine Assembly Groups (MOMAG)	11	26%
LAMPS MK-1 Anti-Sub Warfare Squadrons	2	13%
Carrier Air Wings (with 5 combat squadrons)	1	9%
Helicopter ASW Squadrons	1	9%

Note:

1. Percentages determined by counting like-type units or personnel.

Source: The Naval Reserve.

Data as of 30 Sep 1995.

## Appendix D

### Marine Corps Reserve Contributions to the Total Marine Corps

<b>Unit Type (1)</b>	<b>Number of Units</b>	<b>Percent of Total Marine Corps</b>
Civil Affairs Groups	2	100%
Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies	2	50%
Force Reconnaissance Companies	2	50%
Tank Battalions	2	47%
Reconnaissance Platoons	21	40%
Light Armored Recon Battalions	1	33%
Artillery Battalions	5	33%
Combat Engineer Battalions	1	31%
Infantry Regiments	3	27%
Light Armored Infantry (LAI)	1	25%
Engineer Support Battalions	1	25%
Landing Support Battalions	1	25%
Headquarters and Service Battalions	1	25%
Maintenance Battalions	1	25%
Supply Battalions	1	25%
Motor Transport Battalions	1	25%
Medical Battalions	1	25%
Dental Battalions	1	25%
Communications Battalions	1	25%
Assault Amphibian Battalions	1	17%
<b>Aircraft Types (2)</b>		
<b>Marine Aircraft Wing</b>	1	25%
Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron	2	40%
Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron	1	25%
<b>Marine Aircraft Group</b>	4	29%
Adversary Squadron	1	100%
Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron	4	33%
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron	4	26%
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron	2	25%
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron	2	25%
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron	2	12%
<b>Marine Air Control Group</b>	1	25%
Light Antiaircraft Missile (LAAM) Battalion	1	50%
Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Battalion	1	33%
Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron	1	25%
Marine Air Support Squadron	1	25%
Marine Air Control Squadron	1	25%
Marine Wing Communications Squadron	1	14%
<b>Marine Wing Support Group</b>	1	25%
Marine Wing Support Squadron	4	28%
Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron	1	25%

Notes:

1. Percentages determined by counting like-type units.
2. Percentages determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

Source: The Marine Corps Reserve. Data as of 30 Sep 1995.

## Appendix E

### Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Contributions to the Total Air Force

<u>Flying Units</u>	<u>Air National Guard</u>	<u>Air Force Reserve</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Air Force</u>
<b>Aircraft (1)</b>			
Weather Reconnaissance	0	10	100%
Aerial Spraying	0	4	100%
Strategic Interceptor Force	150	0	100%
Tactical Airlift	180	104	66%
Air Rescue/Recovery	25	31	64%
Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tankers	204	57	49%
Tactical Air Support	42	12	46%
Tactical Fighters	441	114	37%
Strategic Airlift	28	68	30%
Support Aircraft	51	0	24%
Bombers	10	8	16%
Special Operations	6	10	15%
<b>Aircrews (2)</b>			
Aeromedical Evacuations	1,669	3,471	87%
Strategic Airlift (Associate)	0	9,212	50%
Tanker/Cargo (Associate)	0	1,198	41%
Aeromedical Airlift (Associate)	0	243	35%
<b><u>Non-Flying Units</u></b>			
Aircraft Control and Warning	2	0	100%
Aerial Port	24	443	81%
Combat Communications	48	3	79%
Tactical Control	29	0	74%
Engineering Installation	19	0	68%
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons	0	6	62%
Civil Engineering (3)	97	51	61%
Strategic Airlift Maintenance (Associate)	0	24	48%
Weather	33	0	46%
Security Police	87	36	35%
Medical (4)	94	45	24%
Communications Flights	89	23	22%
Intelligence	4	2	4%

**Notes:**

1. Primary Authorized Aircraft count.
2. Authorized personnel
3. Includes RED HORSE Units.
4. Excludes aeromedical and evacuation personnel.

Sources: The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.

Data as of 30 Sep 1995.

## Appendix F

### Legal Authority for Accessing the RC[26]

The CINC's access RC units and individuals by two methods: (1) voluntary active duty, and (2) involuntary call-up. For involuntary call-up, one of three methods of mobilization will be selected: (1) Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC); (2) Partial Mobilization; and (3) Full Mobilization. Each is described below.

#### *Voluntary Active Duty*

Title 10 USC Section 672d grants the authority to order reservists to active duty with their *voluntarily* consent (and the State Governor for members of the National Guard). This is a principle means of accessing RC personnel for participation in non-crisis, peacetime missions (e.g., humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping)

#### *Involuntary Call-Up*

##### *Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC)*

Title 10 USC Section 673b (now 12304) grants the authority for the President to order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve to active duty *without their consent* (involuntarily) for up to 270 days, to augment operational missions, without the declaration of a national emergency. There is no access to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) under 673b. This authority was designed to serve as a precursor for a partial mobilization of the Ready Reserve under Section 673, or a full mobilization under Section 672.

##### *Partial Mobilization*

Title 10 USC Section 673 grants the authority for the President, following a Presidential or Congressional Declaration of National Emergency or a Congressional Declaration of War, to order up to one million members of the Ready Reserve to active duty *without their consent* (involuntarily) for up to twenty-four months. This activation may be in addition to the 200,000 ordered to active duty under PSRC. Section 673 also provides the authority to access the IRR.

##### *Full Mobilization*

Title 10 USC Section 672 grants the authority for the Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of Transportation when the Coast Guard is not operating with the Navy), following a Congressional Declaration of National Emergency or War, to order all members of the RC to active duty *without their consent* for the duration of the crisis plus six months.

## NOTES

- [1]Seven components form the RC. They include the U.S. Army Reserve, U.S. Army National Guard, U.S.A.F. Reserve, U.S.A.F. National Guard, U.S.N. Reserve, U.S.M.C. Reserve, and *U.S.C.G. Reserve*.
- [2]Accessibility refers to the ability of AC organizations to mobilize RC units and individuals to temporary active duty, either through voluntary or involuntary measures.
- [3]For example, with 97 percent of the Army's Civil Affairs capability in the RC, planners will have to request involuntary call-up authority, or seek volunteers, or employ a combination of the two.
- [4]U.S. Congress, The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 7.
- [5]U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, (Washington: 1996), C-1.
- [6]U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1997-2006, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996), Appendix E, 141.
- [7]*Ibid.*, Appendix E, 141-143.
- [8]U.S. Dept. of Defense, C-1.
- [9]*Ibid.*, 226.
- [10]The White House, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington: U.S. Govt Print. Off., 1996), 11-14.
- [11]Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington: National Defense University Press 1995), 4.
- [12]Deborah R. Lee, "25 Years of Total Force," The Officer, February 1996, 40.
- [13]U.S. General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: Reservists Have Volunteered When Needed, Report to Congressional Requesters, (Washington: 1996), 5.
- [14]Institute for Defense Analyses, Case Studies in Reserve Component Volunteerism, IDAD D-1695, (Alexandria, VA: 1995), 1-9. Responding to a request by the AC for OP/PERSTEMPO relief, the Commanding General, Marine Forces Reserve, ordered the 25th Marine's to deploy a rifle company within four days to Cuba to provide security for internee camps at Guantanamo Naval Station. Reservists from Echo company were called and told by their company commander to muster the following day (Saturday) for a special drill. The troops were also notified the company had been alerted for an operational mission, but they were not told that it was to be a volunteer mission. The following day the company commander explained the mission and informed them it was voluntary. Group dynamics and the chain of command made it difficult to refuse.
- [15]Institute for Defense Analyses, Reserve Component Roles, Mix, and Employment, IDA D-1708, (Alexandria, VA: 1995), A-16-17.
- [16]*Ibid.*, A-49.
- [17]*Ibid.*, A-20. When told on 16 Aug 1990 that 145,000 reservists were needed for ODS/S, President Bush, recalling past political problems stemming from call-ups (e.g. Berlin in 1961, Pueblo Incident in 1968, and Vietnam), responded that this was too large a call-up at one time and directed that reservists only be called up as needed and released when no longer needed. This led to the development of a three phased call-up by the Joint Staff and Service staffs.
- [18]Deborah R. Lee, My Goals for the Reserve Components.

<<http://raweb.osd.mil/docs/esgrm6.htm>> (18 January 1997).

[19]Terrence M. O'Connell, "America's Strength." The Officer, February 1996, 46.

[20]For information on USERRA and mobilization insurance program see: Deborah R. Lee, "25 Years of Total Force," The Officer, February 1996, 41.

[21]For information on tax credits to employers of Reservists see: Deborah R. Lee, "25 Years of Total Force," The Officer, February 1996, 41. For information on pilot program for health care and task force on recruiting and retention see: Deborah R. Lee, Remarks to the Reserve Components National Security Course, National Defense University. 1 August 1996.

<<http://raweb.osd.mil/docs/NDU..hmt>> (28 November 1996).

[22]George A. Joulwan, "Reserve Component Campaign Plan," The Officer, October 1996, 23-32.

[23]Deborah R. Lee, "25 Years of Total Force," The Officer, February 1996, 40. The Services (except Air Force) did not budget sufficient active duty funds to support DOD's program to employ the RC to relieve AC OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. To fund the initiative DOD provided \$25 million for FY96 and FY97.

[24]Institute for Defense Analyses, A-50. The Institute for Defense Analyses suggested "It is worth considering that it may be unnecessarily awkward to require that a CINC initiate such a [PSRC] request. A better procedure may be to obtain definitive high level guidance on the availability of PSRC authority during the planning process, tell the CINC at the outset whether such authority is or will be available, and have the Joint Staff itself initiate the PSRC authority request at the proper time."

[25]Thomas L. Wilkerson and John W. Hill, "Getting the Most From Marine Forces Reserve," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1996, 59. The Marine Corps employed 56 percent of its Reserve during Desert Storm. If the Marine Corps participated in that operation today it would take 114 percent of the Marine Corps Reserve; a result of force structure reductions.

[26]U.S. Laws, U.S. Code, Title 10--Armed Forces. 1994 ed. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995), sec 12301. This reference contains a complete legal description of the call-up authorities described here.

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